Reserve Bank of India has released a list of 34 forex brokers; which has been declared illegal
List of unauthorized forex trading apps and websites - RBI
Friends, recently the Reserve Bank of India has released a list of 34 forex brokers; which has been declared illegal. https://preview.redd.it/dc1l0ca388o91.jpg?width=637&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=1a865302fede2fd22985b27c767481ecb4219204 Before releasing this list, RBI had done all checks regarding all transactions of all those forex brokers since February this year. Maybe this doesn't matter to you; Nevertheless, you should definitely check this list once. So see if your forex broker is not on this list! 👉 Here's a full list of unauthorized forex trading apps and websites
Alpari
AnyFX
Ava Trade
Binomo
e Toro
Exness
Expert Option
FBS
FinFxPro
Forex.com
Forex4money
Foxorex
FTMO
FVP Trade
FXPrimus
FXStreet
FXCm
FxNice
FXTM
HotFores
ibell Markets
IC Markets
iFOREX
IG Markets
IQ Option
NTS Forex Trading
Octa FX
Olymp Trade
TD Ameritrade
TP Global FX
Trade Sight FX
Urban Forex
Xm
XTB
Thanks for Reading. Please share your take on this.
I dont defend this douche guy, he deserve it for being an @sshole. Tapi ada yang punya kronologi jelasnya dia sebenarnya ngapain sebagai affliator binomo? Gua cari di berita isinya di luar konteks dan isinya "diduga" dan ga jelasin kronologi urutannya sampe urusan pacarnya segala. Ada yang bilang dia sebagai affliator meraup uang loss pemainnya. Gua ga ngerti soal app binomo tapi apa itu hasil loss bisa connect ke "kantong" dia? Apa dia jadi agen perantara ketiga macam judi bola? Does binomo even legal? I mean its legal in India. Dan konsepnya nyambung ke forex kan? Gua cuman pengen tahu aja ginian, bahkan telegram grup mayoritas kalangan "investor" begitu kan disangka tempat chat teroris dulu kan dan terus disuruh uninstall. I have trust issues because massive of propraganda we are facing rn.
Gak bisa dipungkiri sepanjang tahun 2020-2021 banyak orang memulai investasinya karena influence sosial media. Beruntung bagi yang memulai investasinya lebih awal dan agak celaka bagi yang mulai investasinya di akhir-akhir tanpa tau konsekuensinya. Banyak kasus orang beli saham pake pinjol. Beli BTC, Altcoin pake utangan, uang arisan, bahkan sumbangan gereja. my advice for you yang kena FOMO: Miner musiman: Ketika crypto turun drastis di Januari-Februari 2022. Segera jual alat miningmu karena kamu harus menunggu 2024 untuk bisa panen. Karena ketika kamu beli mining rig sekarang harganya sudah naik berkali-kali lipat dari harga wajarnya. Perhitungkan kembali listrik yang harus kamu keluarkan, Gak BEP istilahnya. Contoh nyata Founder Rekeningku yang boncos bertahun-tahun karena nutupin biaya listrik dan beli mining rig kemahalan, baru panen akhir2 ini. Robot trading: Royal Q , Forex dll. Robot trading is scam, jauhi sekarang sebelum terlambat. Janji manis seller Royal Q dan robot forex profit konisten itu gak ada buktinya 100% scam. Kisah nyata banyak yg bunuh diri karena tiba-tiba assetnya hilang diaveraging oleh robot. Jangan sampai kamu jadi korbannya Trader Binomo, Binary option: Kamu yang baru memulai binary option, inilah saatnya dirimu keluar dari sistem jahat Judi 2.0 mungkin diawal kamu akan merasakan profit namun lama kelamaan akan susah dan tiba-tiba akun tersuspen tanpa sebab. Jelakanya gak ada yg bisa jamin akunmu balik karena Binomo dan lainnya jelas ilegal di Indonesia sehingga penyedia layanan tidak diketahui siapa. Trader Saham musiman via signal telegram : Saham ada bull market dan bearish market, lengkapi dirimu dengan FA dan TA tambah bandarmology juga. Investing stock is about your move, bukan orang lain. Jadi pastikan semua keputusan investasi kamu yang buat bukan orang lain. Trader Crypto: Bear market is coming, we need to understand what crypto still alive for next 4 Years(next halving) DCA still the best strategy for you. We will face the second Bull Run but dont fall for it to much, cause second bull run means next winter season. note: I hope yall getting more profit and healthy. May the Force be with you
Here are the final Parts 8-10, of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Parts 1-7 covered Paysafe’s outlook on growth, debt, and profit, along with insider ownership and competition. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1 (Growth), and following the links from there if still interested.
8. Management
As part of Paysafe’s preparations for the next phase of growth, the company has undergone a complete management overhaul. Along with replacing nearly all the Board of Directors, in the last two years, they’ve hired a new CEO, new CFO, new CTO, new CIO, new CRO and new CISO. They’ve hired PayPal’s Chief Risk Officer and have also filled key division CEO positions with Facebook’s Head of Payments and Amazon Intl’s Head of Payments. This does not sound like an operation with a passive outlook. Still, many are rightfully frustrated that management has done little publicly to support the share price since going public. Despite a steady supply of positive news, the CEO has not once meaningfully engaged the media to highlight Paysafe’s value story. It may be that management is deliberately downplaying its messaging while shares move from short-term trader’s hands to those of value-seeking funds in order to better secure long-term share value. Or, they are simply focused on producing the numbers. Regardless, what management may lack in public storytelling, it makes up for in execution. In the short time since they went public, they have announced 3 new acquisitions and over 25 expanded partnerships with the likes of Visa, Coinbase, Fubo Gaming, FOXbet, Golden Nugget, Bankable, Wix, Repay, WynnBet, Betfred USA, OwnersBox, Dutch neobank bunq, IntelliPay, Glory Ltd, Parx Interactive, TripGift, SweePay, SimplePayMe, Smart Property Systems, Ambassador Cruise Line, Shelby Financial, ResponseCRM, ZEN, Montana Lottery, PlayUP, SuperBook Sports and Bitrise. In that same period, they’ve also:
expanded their US launch of digital wallet Skrill to 48 states,
expanded their digital wallets to trade 38 [digital]currencies and 40 global fiat currencies
launched online cash payments on Microsoft’s Xbox in 22 countries
struck deals with Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS to support its migration to a cloud-based platform as part of their strategy to scale quickly and leverage data to drive customer acquisition,
a unique innovation that quickly led to a new deal with ARC, a payment settlement service that processes $97 billion for over 200 airlines globally.
Also during this time, they announced the appointments of:
Digital wallet division CEO, Chirag Patel (fmr Head of Payments at Amazon Intl., Santander)
North American iGaming CEO, Zak Cutler (fmr DraftKings exec),
Boardmember Mark Brooker (fmr COO Betfair, non-exec dir. William Hill)
All that done while reporting a profitable quarter, beating on revenue and EPS consensus, reporting 41% total payment volume (TPV) growth, refinancing all debt for significant cost savings, after putting deals in place throughout North America to lead in any new iGaming market as soon as it opens (as just happened with their 100% positioning in Canada’s newly opened sports betting market). As Bill Foley said, “we’re seeding the future growth right now… The day a state opens up, we are there ready from a regulatory perspective, from a risk perspective, and from a product perspective…It’s our job to be there first and to make sure we dominate.” They have not slept on this promise even as they quietly lay the groundwork to do the same thing in South America. Lastly, major shareholder and Paysafe Chairman of the Board, Bill Foley has repeatedly proven himself to be a trusted and highly effective deal maker with a remarkably consistent track record in growing shareholder value. Bloomberg describes Foley as someone who prides himself on operating experience, who has a known talent for corporate maneuvering and brings with him a full team of seasoned financial managers. The types of acquisitions described in Part 1 are central to Paysafe’s “value creation playbook” which is exactly how Foley, grew FIS 36x from a market cap of $2.5 billion to over $90 billion. From the beginning of the deal to bring Paysafe public, Foley said, “those characteristics of FIS are right in line with what we plan on doing with Paysafe... FIS has very similar characteristics to Paysafe – an attractive platform with a defensible market position. Upside from acquisition integration, platform consolidation and cross-selling. We will cross-sell, cross-sell, and cross-sell.” In this context, it’s worth underscoring Foley’s undeniably history of simultaneously growing multiple companies. Over just the last six years, Foley successfully grew Ceridian 3.3x, Dun & Bradstreet 5.6x, and Black Knight 8.7x. He’s also known for growing Fidelity National Financial from $3 Million market cap to $10.8 Billion (3,600x). In all cases, he has significantly expanded their margins between 500 to 1800 bps. Foley said, “My whole history and career has been around acquiring companies and fixing companies.” Though he’s not Paysafe’s front man, his fingerprints are evident and IR has recently assured that “ Bill is highly engaged with the company.” Personally, I don’t doubt it.
9. Lockup Expiration
Some bears still point to PSFE overhang from lockups but all share lockups expired months ago, except for founder shares which constitute about 4% of outstanding shares (20F p. 135). That lockup is expected to expire in December. Personally, lockup expiry of such a small percentage of shares is not deterring me from continuing to build a position before Paysafe starts reporting better numbers. This is especially true when those shares are controlled by Chairman Foley, who is central to Paysafe’s value creation playbook. Between Foley’s consistent track record, the proxy statement below and Blackstone’s stance on future growth, all signs indicate a long-term hold. Upon approving the deal to bring Paysafe public, the founders identified “base returns for a four year hold period” of “2.9x to 3.8x” from $10. From their proxy statement (SEC filing-DEFM14A): “The Business Combination could provide base returns for a four year hold period assuming exit multiples between 20-25x next twelve month EBITDA, reflecting a range of internal rate of return of 30.9% to 39.2% and a multiple on invested capital of 2.9x to 3.8x, in each case, based on the FTAC initial public offering price of $10.00 per share, while recognizing that the achievement of such returns could not be assured, and that the Business Combination has similar characteristics to other transactions involving Mr. Foley in the financial technologies industry, including an attractive platform with a defensible market position and multiple attractive acquisition opportunities to strengthen market position further, each of which made PGHL an attractive investment for FTAC.”
10. Valuation
Paysafe is building an integrated architecture that is worth more than the sum of its parts. By leveraging an asset-light cloud-based model to efficiently scale up in new high growth markets globally, Paysafe is a perfect example of the low capex Fintech profile that generally warrants high valuation multiples. Now trading around 4x a conservative F2022 revenue with nearly every institutional owner’s cost basis 20-40% higher than the current price, it would appear PSFE is severely undervalued. Perhaps because Paysafe didn't go public via the traditional IPO method it is being lumped in with highly speculative pre-revenue ventures. But Paysafe is anything but that. Or maybe the current low price is simply a reflection of broadly disseminated misleading information like the articles on debt quoted in Part 2 or like the several articles falsely claiming Paysafe went public at a 3x higher valuation above its 2017 take private price. Some articles claim this by mistaking British pounds for US dollars while a Yahoo Finance article claimed a "300% higher" valuation with bad math and a false comparison between enterprise value (inclusive of debt) and a misquoted 2017 market cap price of “$3.7 billion”, exclusive of debt. Inclusive of debt (enterprise value), Paysafe was taken private for $4.7 billion, according to Reuters. To make its bear case, that article misquotes the relevant 2017 take private value by a full billion dollars. Initially, I wondered why just about every bearish article relied on faulty or misleading information to make its valuation case, or why so many platforms misreported PSFE’s financial data, like YF’s overstating a Q1 EPS miss as -0.23 EPS instead of -0.05 (fixed months later); or why does a Credit Suisse analyst offer new price targets 4 times in 5 months with the first change just two days after initiating coverage and the last change, to neutral, just two weeks before Q3ER. Instead of waiting a few days for new data highly relevant to his thesis, the analyst cites, as if Q2 were a new revelation, months old information most of which was available before he first initiated coverage. (Coincidentally, he issued this two minutes before pre-market, precisely when PSFE was on the verge of breaking above the confluence of its 9-month downtrend resistance line and the 50DMA). Negligence or intentional price manipulation, take your pick. Skeptics may cringe at this idea but this is really nothing new. It’s not like the market is unaware of analyst conflicts of interest or that Credit Suisse has shown itself to be an upstanding market participant (think lawsuit for misleading investors on Archegos, $5.3B fine for mortgage backed securities,$2.5B fine after pleading guilty for aiding in tax fraud, and the recent $547M fine after admitting to regulatory breaches, secret loans, lying to authorities and spying on employees). On the other hand, this could be CS trying to clean up its act by playing it safe or an analyst trying to preserve his reputation by keeping price targets closer to market. If so, this may have the flip-side benefit of future incremental upgrades. Obviously, this is all conjecture, which really doesn’t matter in the long run. True price discovery will take form as share rotation plays out and Paysafe's value story becomes clear. Until then, here are a few reference points: Looking at Paysafe’s eCash segment as a separate company: The eCash segment is a high margin business with over 12 million active users, $5 billion in volume, $405 million in TTM revenue and $157 million EBITDA. For H1/21, they just reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth. Not many Fintech companies can claim that. Adyen is a Fintech with a similar growth profile, (46% YoY revenue growth and 27% YoY EBITDA growth). Applying Adyen’s 19x EV/rev ratio to Paysafe’s eCash business alone, would give it a $7.6 billion enterprise value. That’s close to the current valuation of the entirety of Paysafe, yet this one segment represents less than a third of total revenue. Using Adyen’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 149x would value Paysafe’s eCash segment at $23.3 billion. Even when applying the company’s entire debt to that one segment, the share price for just the eCash business alone would still be $26.62. Again, that represents less than a third of Paysafe’s total business. Brick & Mortar Payment Processing Paysafe is a value play right now but bears focus on growth. Paysafe has an established history of 27-30% CAGR but because recent growth was temporarily stifled by China de-risking exits and Covid-related closures, some equally hard-hit brick & mortar payment processing partners, like Visa and Mastercard, offer an interesting comparison. For 2020, Visa reported negative YoY revenue growth (-8.7%) and negative EBITDA growth (-10.2%). Similarly, Mastercard reported negative YoY revenue growth (-9.4%) and negative EBITDA growth (-14.20%). Their forward growth is projected to be 7.7% and 10% respectively. In all forward growth metrics, including EBITDA and EPS, they do worse than Paysafe, yet they both trade at an EV/Rev multiple of roughly 24X. This would put PSFE at $41.80. Digital Wallet vs. Digital Wallet Many compare the #1 digital wallet, PayPal, to the #2 digital wallet, Paysafe, so, hopefully without striking a nerve, here’s a deeper look into that comparison: As noted earlier, Paysafe’s stock was recently clobbered down 30% (to 3.2x P/S) on soft Q3 guidance even though they reaffirmed full year guidance and beat consensus on revenue and EPS. By comparison, PayPal missed Q3 guidance for both revenue and EPS. PayPal was also reported to be falling short on their 2021 full year guidance AND they missed on Q2 revenue consensus while also reporting a -23%YoY decline on EPS. PYPL only went down 10% (from a lofty 15x P/S) as news outlets characterized PayPal’s troubles as a “buying opportunity.” Some will reasonably say that’s because PayPal has such strong growth history but, from the time PayPal’s numbers were available separately from its parent eBay, 2012-2020, PayPal grew 17.8% CAGR ($5.6b to $21.5b). In that same period, Paysafe has grown 30.5% CAGR ($169m to $1.43b). Paysafe reported 27%CAGR prior to 2020’s restructuring and, in just the last year, when excluding Paysafe’s 2020 de-risking exits, they reported 23% YoY growth for Q2 which is on par with PayPal’s recent report of 19% YoY growth. This comparative history serves only to show that Paysafe has a strong track record that should not be discounted. Paysafe is still priced as if it is a zero growth, pre-revenue speculative venture. Meanwhile, though some have called PayPal a “free cash flow machine,” Paysafe already generates proportionately more free cash flow than PayPal (25% FCF margin vs. 20% FCF margin). There’s obviously more to this complex story but, for reference, below is PSFE potential share value when applying PYPL’s multiples (now 25% off highs) when factoring in all of PSFE’s potential acquisition debt and dilution:
PayPal’s EV/FCF ratio of 66.9X puts PSFE at $33.10
PayPal’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 44.3X puts PSFE at $24.90
PayPal’s Price to Sales ratio of 13.5X puts PSFE at $28.40.
PayPal’s EV/Rev ratio of 12.4x puts PSFE at $20.75
PayPal’s free cash flow yield of 1.7% puts PSFE at $29.41
Those metrics average to a share price of $27.31 When factoring in a potential 24% growth, 35% EBITDA margin, 75-80% FCF conversion, the potential share value climbs fairly quickly. Sector multiples: Because Paysafe is far more diversified than the average Fintech, a while back I compared it to a wide basket of Fintech peers including PayPal, Square, Nuvei, Repay, Shift4, Adyen, Affirm, BILL, GPN, and Paysign. Collectively, they have a ~12.5% growth rate. Unlike Paysafe, a third of this group reported negative free cash flow and negative EBITDA and half reported negative EBITDA growth. Paysafe also currently has better EPS and a better Debt/EBITDA ratio than over half the group. After removing the top-end outliers in each category that put PSFE above $100 and discounting all by an additional 10%, here’s Paysafe’s share price with the averaged peer multiples:
EV/EBITDA ratio : $45.67
EV/Rev ratio : $40.17
EV/FCF ratio : $39.72
Average : $41.84 It's worth pointing out here that, as happened with FIS’s tremendous growth history, stock prices tend to temporarily pull back in association with acquisitions. This may explain some of PSFE’s recent price action, but certainly not all. Sure, it’s easy to read all of the material in Parts 1-10 and say, “the market doesn’t care,” but I’m confident that’ll change when share rotation settles and quarterly ER’s gradually shift focus from the past to the future. Stripped of superficial misdirection, bear arguments often devolve down to variations of “look at the chart” and “price is truth.” This has been said about many companies in the past as they position themselves for future growth. No, this is not the next Amazon but Bezos had it right when he said, “The stock is not the company. And the company is not the stock. ... And so, while the stock price was going the wrong way, everything inside the company was going the right way.” Do with this what you will. These are simply observations. Feel free to correct any errors, point out things I missed or use this material any way you wish. To be perfectly clear, this is not financial advice. I am not a financial advisor nor am I associated in any way with any commercial interests beyond my own. Given how much disinformation has been out there, I thought I’d do my bit to peel back the layers on what I consider to be a reliable long term investment. This concludes our public service announcement. We now return to normal programming.
Here are Parts 2 - 4 of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Part 1 covers Paysafe’s outlook on growth, and an expected miss for Q3ER. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1, and following the links if still interested.
2. Debt
Paysafe’s recent acquisitions, (two of which now completed) have spawned several misleading claims using faulty numbers to generate doubt about the company’s ability to manage debt. For example:
One article tried to make a specific case that Paysafe can’t cover debt due to Q2’s 46% free cash flow conversion rate. The author's acrobatic bias ignores the obvious fact that the Q2 balance sheet clearly states a year-to-date free cash flow conversion rate of 70%, not 46%. The CFO noted that Q2’s conversion rate was temporarily affected by a one-time tax payment that is to be partially refunded. (Notably, Q1’s free cash flow conversion rate was 96%. At $108 million, it was a 28% YoY increase.)
Another article cries liquidity problems, citing, “Paysafe Ltds earnings cannot cover its interest expense. If the situation continues, the company may have to issue more debt.” By relying on websites that blindly auto-calculate debt service ratios, the article doesn't account for recent debt restructuring and dramatically misrepresents forward expenses by ignoring:
$84 million in one-time merger related expenses will not be repeated,
over $40 million in one-time debt restructuring fees will not be repeated,
newly reduced interest expenses resulting in roughly $70 million in annualized savings.
A third article mistakenly claims Paysafe, “will add another $1 billion in net debt to close the Latin America deals.” In truth, the two deals mentioned total $550 million (SafetyPay at $441m and Pago Efectivo at $108.5m). A third European acquisition, viafintech, may bring the total to $670 million, much of which can be covered between Paysafe’s $247.8 million in cash, their $270 million in undrawn revolving credit and their $360-$430 million in free cash flow. Total added debt will likely be less than half of what the article assumes. (In fairness, the author later admitted he read the transcript wrong.)
After paying down $1.2 billion in debt in Q1, Paysafe used its two notch credit rating upgrade from Moody’s and S&P to reorganize remaining debt, extend maturity and significantly lower average interest rates, reducing interest expenses by $70 million. The result, inclusive of new debt from acquisitions: credit upgrades were reaffirmed along with a $305 million revolving credit facility and the company will save around $43 million in annualized interest expense. This means forward debt-related costs are on track to drop by more than half, from an estimated $165 million in 2021 to less than $80 million in 2022. Combined with $84 million in other non-recurring merger-related expenses, that’s over $160 million in cost reductions going forward. Strong free cash flow and over $160 million in reduced costs can go a long way to quickly paying down debt. Add in the expected acquisition growth synergies and the company’s quoted path to a 35% EBITDA margin, and the picture looks even better. Management noted, “the deal synergies and our growth profile will allow us to de-lever quickly and meaningfully make progress in 2022 towards our target of 3.5 times adjusted EBITDA.” The very realistic potential of 17-18% revenue growth could attain that target ratio in short order. All this points to sustainable deleveraging, paving the way for more growth through M&A. (It also doesn’t hurt that the company stands to take in more than half a billion cash from outstanding warrants, which will directly benefit enterprise value and inorganic growth potential.) Carrying large debt is extremely common in the Fintech sector and Paysafe is by no means an outlier here. (Square, Repay, Fiserv, Shift4, Affirm, Bill and Paysign all have worse debt/EBITDA ratios and most of them still have negative earnings). In itself, debt leverage is not a bad thing, particularly if it’s manageable and generates more growth. That definitely appears to be the case here.
3. Profit
When considering how Paysafe is setting itself up for future profit potential, here are some points worth underscoring:
Without $92 million in non-recurring costs, Q1 would have been very profitable, beating analysts consensus by as much +0.10 EPS.
Despite Q2’s $40 million in non-repeating costs, Paysafe still managed to beat on earnings with its first profitable quarter as a newly public company.
Roughly $167 million in H1 expenses will not repeat going forward:
$84m one-time share based compensation,
$40m one-time accelerated capitalized debt fees,
$43m estimated reduction in annual interest expenses
Those reductions alone represent a potential +0.22 EPS, which exceeds analysts projections. (Some platforms have reported analysts estimate 3-400% profit growth for 2022 with an average of 75% annual profit growth thereafter. Fortunately, on Q3 guidance, analysts have been revising their forward estimates downwards which ultimately better positions PSFE to beat consensus down the road. This contrasts with analysts’ initial EPS estimates which did not appear to fully account for the one-time merger and debt restructuring costs.)
Paysafe’s margins are also expected to expand as they work through deliberate measures to de-risk future growth. For example, their integrated processing take rate has been compressed by strategic Direct Marketing exits in anticipation of new compliance rules. This is expected to abate by end of year. Management notes: “we do expect EBITDA margins to expand in the back-half of the year and to continue that like a steady drumbeat going into next year as well” reflecting “continued strength in integrated processing, including the on-boarding of several new e-commerce clients in late Q3 and early Q4, stronger growth in digital wallet as well as sequential improvement in direct marketing.”
Between Q3 and FY guidance, there is an implied guidance for a Q4 EBITDA of $153 million. That represents a YoY EBITDA growth of 60.5%, which may offer a signal as to how moving beyond legacy de-risking headwinds can start to improve the margin picture going forward.
Their fastest growing segment, eCash, has a high take rate of 7.2%. For H1/21, they reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth which would reasonably point to a future business mix with higher overall margins. Further growth in this segment stands to benefit from their new LATAM expansion, their new Glory Ltd partnership, as well as their recently launched US campaign to engage the US/Mexico remittance market (worth $40 billion annually). Also, their Xbox deal expands eCash in 22 countries and their recent deals with ZEN, REPAY, and IntelliPay further expands their eCash network across the US and in 25 European countries.
With a gross margin of 61-63%, upon execution of their two year strategy to “unlock over $100m organic adj. EBITDA” (page 28), management cites a potential “pro forma upside that could drive EBITDA CAGR to 21%.”
One aspect of this margin expansion strategy is in the company’s ongoing integration of their various business segments into a single code on a cloud-based gateway, the Unity Platform. This streamlining will enable them to reduce costs and scale up quickly in new markets and in emerging verticals like travel, trading in the wallet, digital goods, online gaming, and banking as a service. Among the benefits of this new synthesis:
it increases operating margins through cost-saving efficiencies and eliminating redundancies (automating underwriting, 2/3 reduction in data centers)
it enables them to forward unsolicited cost savings to partners, merchants and users, helping them retain and gain new marketshare,
it eliminates on-boarding each service separately by making their entire suite automatically available through a single gateway, which builds in substantial cross-selling opportunities
4. Float
The number of institutional funds owning PSFE has grown from 187 to 300 over the last quarter. At this point, nearly all the major funds hold shares at a cost basis much higher than the current price. These include Wells Fargo, Blackrock, Citigroup, State Street, JP Morgan, Francisco Partners, Naya Capital and noted fund managers like Dan Loeb (Third Point), David Tepper (Appaloosa), Aaron Cohen (Survetta), Seth Rosen (Nitorum) and Leon Cooperman, (who personally owns over a million shares). Notably, most of these investors bought shares before Paysafe’s recent history of value creation. Cross-referencing the most up to date record with older filings, some estimate the true available float is between 70-80 million shares. For what has historically been a low beta stock, theoretically, a reduced free float influences the proportionate affect of true short interest and could cause the stock price to move faster. Continue to Parts 5-7 Links to the rest of the article can be found in Part 1 once they are complete. Note: some article links are missing because they are banned by this sub
Here are the final Parts 8-10, of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Parts 1-7 covered Paysafe’s outlook on growth, debt, and profit, along with insider ownership and competition. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1 (Growth), and following the links from there if still interested.
8. Management
As part of Paysafe’s preparations for the next phase of growth, the company has undergone a complete management overhaul. Along with replacing nearly all the Board of Directors, in the last two years, they’ve hired a new CEO, new CFO, new CTO, new CIO, new CRO and new CISO. They’ve hired PayPal’s Chief Risk Officer and have also filled key division CEO positions with Facebook’s Head of Payments and Amazon Intl’s Head of Payments. This does not sound like an operation with a passive outlook. Still, many are rightfully frustrated that management has done little publicly to support the share price since going public. Despite a steady supply of positive news, the CEO has not once meaningfully engaged the media to highlight Paysafe’s value story. It may be that management is deliberately downplaying its messaging while shares move from short-term trader’s hands to those of value-seeking funds in order to better secure long-term share value. Or, they are simply focused on producing the numbers. Regardless, what management may lack in public storytelling, it makes up for in execution. In the short time since they went public, they have announced 3 new acquisitions and over 25 expanded partnerships with the likes of Visa, Coinbase, Fubo Gaming, FOXbet, Golden Nugget, Bankable, Wix, Repay, WynnBet, Betfred USA, OwnersBox, Dutch neobank bunq, IntelliPay, Glory Ltd, Parx Interactive, TripGift, SweePay, SimplePayMe, Smart Property Systems, Ambassador Cruise Line, Shelby Financial, ResponseCRM, ZEN, Montana Lottery, PlayUP, SuperBook Sports and Bitrise. In that same period, they’ve also:
expanded their US launch of digital wallet Skrill to 48 states,
expanded their digital wallets to trade 38 cryptocurrencies and 40 global fiat currencies
launched online cash payments on Microsoft’s Xbox in 22 countries
struck deals with Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS to support its migration to a cloud-based platform as part of their strategy to scale quickly and leverage data to drive customer acquisition,
a unique innovation that quickly led to a new deal with ARC, a payment settlement service that processes $97 billion for over 200 airlines globally.
Also during this time, they announced the appointments of:
Digital wallet division CEO, Chirag Patel (fmr Head of Payments at Amazon Intl., Santander)
North American iGaming CEO, Zak Cutler (fmr DraftKings exec),
Boardmember Mark Brooker (fmr COO Betfair, non-exec dir. William Hill)
All that done while reporting a profitable quarter, beating on revenue and EPS consensus, reporting 41% total payment volume (TPV) growth, refinancing all debt for significant cost savings, after putting deals in place throughout North America to lead in any new iGaming market as soon as it opens (as just happened with their 100% positioning in Canada’s newly opened sports betting market). As Bill Foley said, “we’re seeding the future growth right now… The day a state opens up, we are there ready from a regulatory perspective, from a risk perspective, and from a product perspective…It’s our job to be there first and to make sure we dominate.” They have not slept on this promise even as they quietly lay the groundwork to do the same thing in South America. Lastly, major shareholder and Paysafe Chairman of the Board, Bill Foley has repeatedly proven himself to be a trusted and highly effective deal maker with a remarkably consistent track record in growing shareholder value. Bloomberg describes Foley as someone who prides himself on operating experience, who has a known talent for corporate maneuvering and brings with him a full team of seasoned financial managers. The types of acquisitions described in Part 1 are central to Paysafe’s “value creation playbook” which is exactly how Foley, grew FIS 36x from a market cap of $2.5 billion to over $90 billion. From the beginning of the deal to bring Paysafe public, Foley said, “those characteristics of FIS are right in line with what we plan on doing with Paysafe... FIS has very similar characteristics to Paysafe – an attractive platform with a defensible market position. Upside from acquisition integration, platform consolidation and cross-selling. We will cross-sell, cross-sell, and cross-sell.” In this context, it’s worth underscoring Foley’s undeniably history of simultaneously growing multiple companies. Over just the last six years, Foley successfully grew Ceridian 3.3x, Dun & Bradstreet 5.6x, and Black Knight 8.7x. He’s also known for growing Fidelity National Financial from $3 Million market cap to $10.8 Billion (3,600x). In all cases, he has significantly expanded their margins between 500 to 1800 bps. Foley said, “My whole history and career has been around acquiring companies and fixing companies.” Though he’s not Paysafe’s front man, his fingerprints are evident and IR has recently assured that “ Bill is highly engaged with the company.” Personally, I don’t doubt it.
9. Lockup Expiration
Some bears still point to PSFE overhang from lockups but all share lockups expired months ago, except for founder shares which constitute about 4% of outstanding shares (20F p. 135). That lockup is expected to expire in December. Personally, lockup expiry of such a small percentage of shares is not deterring me from continuing to build a position before Paysafe starts reporting better numbers. This is especially true when those shares are controlled by Chairman Foley, who is central to Paysafe’s value creation playbook. Between Foley’s consistent track record, the proxy statement below and Blackstone’s stance on future growth, all signs indicate a long-term hold. Upon approving the deal to bring Paysafe public, the founders identified “base returns for a four year hold period” of “2.9x to 3.8x” from $10. From their proxy statement (SEC filing-DEFM14A): “The Business Combination could provide base returns for a four year hold period assuming exit multiples between 20-25x next twelve month EBITDA, reflecting a range of internal rate of return of 30.9% to 39.2% and a multiple on invested capital of 2.9x to 3.8x, in each case, based on the FTAC initial public offering price of $10.00 per share, while recognizing that the achievement of such returns could not be assured, and that the Business Combination has similar characteristics to other transactions involving Mr. Foley in the financial technologies industry, including an attractive platform with a defensible market position and multiple attractive acquisition opportunities to strengthen market position further, each of which made PGHL an attractive investment for FTAC.”
10. Valuation
Paysafe is building an integrated architecture that is worth more than the sum of its parts. By leveraging an asset-light cloud-based model to efficiently scale up in new high growth markets globally, Paysafe is a perfect example of the low capex Fintech profile that generally warrants high valuation multiples. Now trading around 4x a conservative F2022 revenue with nearly every institutional owner’s cost basis 20-40% higher than the current price, it would appear PSFE is severely undervalued. Perhaps because Paysafe didn't go public via the traditional IPO method it is being lumped in with highly speculative pre-revenue ventures. But Paysafe is anything but that. Or maybe the current low price is simply a reflection of broadly disseminated misleading information like the articles on debt quoted in Part 2 or like the several articles falsely claiming Paysafe went public at a 3x higher valuation above its 2017 take private price. Some articles claim this by mistaking British pounds for US dollars while a Yahoo Finance article claimed a "300% higher" valuation with bad math and a false comparison between enterprise value (inclusive of debt) and a misquoted 2017 market cap price of “$3.7 billion”, exclusive of debt. Inclusive of debt (enterprise value), Paysafe was taken private for $4.7 billion, according to Reuters. To make its bear case, that article misquotes the relevant 2017 take private value by a full billion dollars. Initially, I wondered why just about every bearish article relied on faulty or misleading information to make its valuation case, or why so many platforms misreported PSFE’s financial data, like YF’s overstating a Q1 EPS miss as -0.23 EPS instead of -0.05 (fixed months later); or why does a Credit Suisse analyst offer new price targets 4 times in 5 months with the first change just two days after initiating coverage and the last change, to neutral, just two weeks before Q3ER. Instead of waiting a few days for new data highly relevant to his thesis, the analyst cites, as if Q2 were a new revelation, months old information most of which was available before he first initiated coverage. (Coincidentally, he issued this two minutes before pre-market, precisely when PSFE was on the verge of breaking above the confluence of its 9-month downtrend resistance line and the 50DMA). Negligence or intentional price manipulation, take your pick. Skeptics may cringe at this idea but this is really nothing new. It’s not like the market is unaware of analyst conflicts of interest or that Credit Suisse has shown itself to be an upstanding market participant (think lawsuit for misleading investors on Archegos, $5.3B fine for mortgage backed securities,$2.5B fine after pleading guilty for aiding in tax fraud, and the recent $547M fine after admitting to regulatory breaches, secret loans, lying to authorities and spying on employees). On the other hand, this could be CS trying to clean up its act by playing it safe or an analyst trying to preserve his reputation by keeping price targets closer to market. If so, this may have the flip-side benefit of future incremental upgrades. Obviously, this is all conjecture, which really doesn’t matter in the long run. True price discovery will take form as share rotation plays out and Paysafe's value story becomes clear. Until then, here are a few reference points: Looking at Paysafe’s eCash segment as a separate company: The eCash segment is a high margin business with over 12 million active users, $5 billion in volume, $405 million in TTM revenue and $157 million EBITDA. For H1/21, they just reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth. Not many Fintech companies can claim that. Adyen is a Fintech with a similar growth profile, (46% YoY revenue growth and 27% YoY EBITDA growth). Applying Adyen’s 19x EV/rev ratio to Paysafe’s eCash business alone, would give it a $7.6 billion enterprise value. That’s close to the current valuation of the entirety of Paysafe, yet this one segment represents less than a third of total revenue. Using Adyen’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 149x would value Paysafe’s eCash segment at $23.3 billion. Even when applying the company’s entire debt to that one segment, the share price for just the eCash business alone would still be $26.62. Again, that represents less than a third of Paysafe’s total business. Brick & Mortar Payment Processing Paysafe is a value play right now but bears focus on growth. Paysafe has an established history of 27-30% CAGR but because recent growth was temporarily stifled by China de-risking exits and Covid-related closures, some equally hard-hit brick & mortar payment processing partners, like Visa and Mastercard, offer an interesting comparison. For 2020, Visa reported negative YoY revenue growth (-8.7%) and negative EBITDA growth (-10.2%). Similarly, Mastercard reported negative YoY revenue growth (-9.4%) and negative EBITDA growth (-14.20%). Their forward growth is projected to be 7.7% and 10% respectively. In all forward growth metrics, including EBITDA and EPS, they do worse than Paysafe, yet they both trade at an EV/Rev multiple of roughly 24X. This would put PSFE at $41.80. Digital Wallet vs. Digital Wallet Many compare the #1 digital wallet, PayPal, to the #2 digital wallet, Paysafe, so, hopefully without striking a nerve, here’s a deeper look into that comparison: As noted earlier, Paysafe’s stock was recently clobbered down 30% (to 3.2x P/S) on soft Q3 guidance even though they reaffirmed full year guidance and beat consensus on revenue and EPS. By comparison, PayPal missed Q3 guidance for both revenue and EPS. PayPal was also reported to be falling short on their 2021 full year guidance AND they missed on Q2 revenue consensus while also reporting a -23%YoY decline on EPS. PYPL only went down 10% (from a lofty 15x P/S) as news outlets characterized PayPal’s troubles as a “buying opportunity.” Some will reasonably say that’s because PayPal has such strong growth history but, from the time PayPal’s numbers were available separately from its parent eBay, 2012-2020, PayPal grew 17.8% CAGR ($5.6b to $21.5b). In that same period, Paysafe has grown 30.5% CAGR ($169m to $1.43b). Paysafe reported 27%CAGR prior to 2020’s restructuring and, in just the last year, when excluding Paysafe’s 2020 de-risking exits, they reported 23% YoY growth for Q2 which is on par with PayPal’s recent report of 19% YoY growth. This comparative history serves only to show that Paysafe has a strong track record that should not be discounted. Paysafe is still priced as if it is a zero growth, pre-revenue speculative venture. Meanwhile, though some have called PayPal a “free cash flow machine,” Paysafe already generates proportionately more free cash flow than PayPal (25% FCF margin vs. 20% FCF margin). There’s obviously more to this complex story but, for reference, below is PSFE potential share value when applying PYPL’s multiples (now 25% off highs) when factoring in all of PSFE’s potential acquisition debt and dilution:
PayPal’s EV/FCF ratio of 66.9X puts PSFE at $33.10
PayPal’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 44.3X puts PSFE at $24.90
PayPal’s Price to Sales ratio of 13.5X puts PSFE at $28.40.
PayPal’s EV/Rev ratio of 12.4x puts PSFE at $20.75
PayPal’s free cash flow yield of 1.7% puts PSFE at $29.41
Those metrics average to a share price of $27.31 When factoring in a potential 24% growth, 35% EBITDA margin, 75-80% FCF conversion, the potential share value climbs fairly quickly. Sector multiples: Because Paysafe is far more diversified than the average Fintech, a while back I compared it to a wide basket of Fintech peers including PayPal, Square, Nuvei, Repay, Shift4, Adyen, Affirm, BILL, GPN, and Paysign. Collectively, they have a ~12.5% growth rate. Unlike Paysafe, a third of this group reported negative free cash flow and negative EBITDA and half reported negative EBITDA growth. Paysafe also currently has better EPS and a better Debt/EBITDA ratio than over half the group. After removing the top-end outliers in each category that put PSFE above $100 and discounting all by an additional 10%, here’s Paysafe’s share price with the averaged peer multiples:
EV/EBITDA ratio : $45.67
EV/Rev ratio : $40.17
EV/FCF ratio : $39.72
Average : $41.84 It's worth pointing out here that, as happened with FIS’s tremendous growth history, stock prices tend to temporarily pull back in association with acquisitions. This may explain some of PSFE’s recent price action, but certainly not all. Sure, it’s easy to read all of the material in Parts 1-10 and say, “the market doesn’t care,” but I’m confident that’ll change when share rotation settles and quarterly ER’s gradually shift focus from the past to the future. Stripped of superficial misdirection, bear arguments often devolve down to variations of “look at the chart” and “price is truth.” This has been said about many companies in the past as they position themselves for future growth. No, this is not the next Amazon but Bezos had it right when he said, “The stock is not the company. And the company is not the stock. ... And so, while the stock price was going the wrong way, everything inside the company was going the right way.” Do with this what you will. These are simply observations. Feel free to correct any errors, point out things I missed or use this material any way you wish. To be perfectly clear, this is not financial advice. I am not a financial advisor nor am I associated in any way with any commercial interests beyond my own. Given how much disinformation has been out there, I thought I’d do my bit to peel back the layers on what I consider to be a reliable long term investment. This concludes our public service announcement. We now return to normal programming.
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Here are Parts 2 - 4 of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Part 1 covers Paysafe’s outlook on growth, and an expected miss for Q3ER. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1, and following the links if still interested.
2. Debt
Paysafe’s recent acquisitions (two of which now completed) have spawned several misleading claims using faulty numbers to generate doubt about the company’s ability to manage debt. For example:
One article tried to make a specific case that Paysafe can’t cover debt due to Q2’s 46% free cash flow conversion rate. The author's acrobatic bias ignores the obvious fact that the Q2 balance sheet clearly states a year-to-date free cash flow conversion rate of 70%, not 46%. The CFO noted that Q2’s conversion rate was temporarily affected by a one-time tax payment that is to be partially refunded. (Notably, Q1’s free cash flow conversion rate was 96%. At $108 million, it was a 28% YoY increase.)
Another article cries liquidity problems, citing, “Paysafe Ltds earnings cannot cover its interest expense. If the situation continues, the company may have to issue more debt.” By relying on websites that blindly auto-calculate debt service ratios, the article doesn't account for recent debt restructuring and dramatically misrepresents forward expenses by ignoring:
$84 million in one-time merger related expenses will not be repeated,
over $40 million in one-time debt restructuring fees will not be repeated,
newly reduced interest expenses resulting in roughly $70 million in annualized savings.
A third article mistakenly claims Paysafe, “will add another $1 billion in net debt to close the Latin America deals.” In truth, the two deals mentioned total $550 million (SafetyPay at $441m and Pago Efectivo at $108.5m). A third European acquisition, viafintech, may bring the total to $670 million, much of which can be covered between Paysafe’s $247.8 million in cash, their $270 million in undrawn revolving credit and their $360-$430 million in free cash flow. Total added debt will likely be less than half of what the article assumes. (In fairness, the author later admitted he read the transcript wrong.)
After paying down $1.2 billion in debt in Q1, Paysafe used its two notch credit rating upgrade from Moody’s and S&P to reorganize remaining debt, extend maturity and significantly lower average interest rates, reducing interest expenses by $70 million. The result, inclusive of new debt from acquisitions: credit upgrades were reaffirmed along with a $305 million revolving credit facility and the company will save around $43 million in annualized interest expense. This means forward debt-related costs are on track to drop by more than half, from an estimated $165 million in 2021 to less than $80 million in 2022. Combined with $84 million in other non-recurring merger-related expenses, that’s over $160 million in cost reductions going forward. Strong free cash flow and over $160 million in reduced costs can go a long way to quickly paying down debt. Add in the expected acquisition growth synergies and the company’s quoted path to a 35% EBITDA margin, and the picture looks even better. Management noted, “the deal synergies and our growth profile will allow us to de-lever quickly and meaningfully make progress in 2022 towards our target of 3.5 times adjusted EBITDA.” The very realistic potential of 17-18% revenue growth could attain that target ratio in short order. All this points to sustainable deleveraging, paving the way for more growth through M&A. (It also doesn’t hurt that the company stands to take in more than half a billion cash from outstanding warrants, which will directly benefit enterprise value and inorganic growth potential.) Carrying large debt is extremely common in the Fintech sector and Paysafe is by no means an outlier here. (Square, Repay, Fiserv, Shift4, Affirm, Bill and Paysign all have worse debt/EBITDA ratios and most of them still have negative earnings). In itself, debt leverage is not a bad thing, particularly if it’s manageable and generates more growth. That definitely appears to be the case here.
3. Profit
When considering how Paysafe is setting itself up for future profit potential, here are some points worth underscoring:
Without $92 million in non-recurring costs, Q1 would have been very profitable, beating analysts consensus by as much +0.10 EPS.
Despite Q2’s $40 million in non-repeating costs, Paysafe still managed to beat on earnings with its first profitable quarter as a newly public company.
Roughly $167 million in H1 expenses will not repeat going forward:
$84m one-time share based compensation,
$40m one-time accelerated capitalized debt fees,
$43m estimated reduction in annual interest expenses
Those reductions alone represent a potential +0.22 EPS, which exceeds analysts projections. (Some platforms have reported analysts estimate 3-400% profit growth for 2022 with an average of 75% annual profit growth thereafter. Fortunately, on Q3 guidance, analysts have been revising their forward estimates downwards which ultimately better positions PSFE to beat consensus down the road. This contrasts with analysts’ initial EPS estimates which did not appear to fully account for the one-time merger and debt restructuring costs.)
Paysafe’s margins are also expected to expand as they work through deliberate measures to de-risk future growth. For example, their integrated processing take rate has been compressed by strategic Direct Marketing exits in anticipation of new compliance rules. This is expected to abate by end of year. Management notes: “we do expect EBITDA margins to expand in the back-half of the year and to continue that like a steady drumbeat going into next year as well” reflecting “continued strength in integrated processing, including the on-boarding of several new e-commerce clients in late Q3 and early Q4, stronger growth in digital wallet as well as sequential improvement in direct marketing.”
Between Q3 and FY guidance, there is an implied guidance for a Q4 EBITDA of $153 million. That represents a YoY EBITDA growth of 60.5%, which may offer a signal as to how moving beyond legacy de-risking headwinds can start to improve the margin picture going forward.
Their fastest growing segment, eCash, has a high take rate of 7.2%. For H1/21, they reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth which would reasonably point to a future business mix with higher overall margins. Further growth in this segment stands to benefit from their new LATAM expansion, their new Glory Ltd partnership, as well as their recently launched US campaign to engage the US/Mexico remittance market (worth $40 billion annually). Also, their Xbox deal expands eCash in 22 countries and their recent deals with ZEN, REPAY, and IntelliPay further expands their eCash network across the US and in 25 European countries.
With a gross margin of 61-63%, upon execution of their two year strategy to “unlock over $100m organic adj. EBITDA” (page 28), management cites a potential “pro forma upside that could drive EBITDA CAGR to 21%.”
One aspect of this margin expansion strategy is in the company’s ongoing integration of their various business segments into a single code on a cloud-based gateway, the Unity Platform. This streamlining will enable them to reduce costs and scale up quickly in new markets and in emerging verticals like travel, trading in the wallet, digital goods, online gaming, and banking as a service. Among the benefits of this new synthesis:
it increases operating margins through cost-saving efficiencies and eliminating redundancies (automating underwriting, 2/3 reduction in data centers)
it enables them to forward unsolicited cost savings to partners, merchants and users, helping them retain and gain new marketshare,
it eliminates on-boarding each service separately by making their entire suite automatically available through a single gateway, which builds in substantial cross-selling opportunities
4. Float
The number of institutional funds owning PSFE has grown from 187 to 300 over the last quarter. At this point, nearly all the major funds hold shares at a cost basis much higher than the current price. These include Wells Fargo, Blackrock, Citigroup, State Street, JP Morgan, Francisco Partners, Naya Capital and noted fund managers like Dan Loeb (Third Point), David Tepper (Appaloosa), Aaron Cohen (Survetta), Seth Rosen (Nitorum) and Leon Cooperman, (who personally owns over a million shares). Notably, most of these investors bought shares before Paysafe’s recent history of value creation. Cross-referencing the most up to date record with older filings, some estimate the true available float is between 70-80 million shares. For what has historically been a low beta stock, theoretically, a reduced free float influences the proportionate affect of true short interest and could cause the stock price to move faster. Continue to Parts 5-7. Links to the rest of the article can be found in Part 1 once they are complete.
Here are the final Parts 8-10, of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Parts 1-7 covered Paysafe’s outlook on growth, debt, and profit, along with insider ownership and competition. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1 (Growth), and following the links from there if still interested.
8. Management
As part of Paysafe’s preparations for the next phase of growth, the company has undergone a complete management overhaul. Along with replacing nearly all the Board of Directors, in the last two years, they’ve hired a new CEO, new CFO, new CTO, new CIO, new CRO and new CISO. They’ve hired PayPal’s Chief Risk Officer and have also filled key division CEO positions with Facebook’s Head of Payments and Amazon Intl’s Head of Payments. This does not sound like an operation with a passive outlook. Still, many are rightfully frustrated that management has done little publicly to support the share price since going public. Despite a steady supply of positive news, the CEO has not once meaningfully engaged the media to highlight Paysafe’s value story. It may be that management is deliberately downplaying its messaging while shares move from short-term trader’s hands to those of value-seeking funds in order to better secure long-term share value. Or, they are simply focused on producing the numbers. Regardless, what management may lack in public storytelling, it makes up for in execution. In the short time since they went public, they have announced 3 new acquisitions and over 25 expanded partnerships with the likes of Visa, Coinbase, Fubo Gaming, FOXbet, Golden Nugget, Bankable, Wix, Repay, WynnBet, Betfred USA, OwnersBox, Dutch neobank bunq, IntelliPay, Glory Ltd, Parx Interactive, TripGift, SweePay, SimplePayMe, Smart Property Systems, Ambassador Cruise Line, Shelby Financial, ResponseCRM, ZEN, Montana Lottery, PlayUP, SuperBook Sports and Bitrise. In that same period, they’ve also:
expanded their US launch of digital wallet Skrill to 48 states,
expanded their digital wallets to trade 38 cryptocurrencies and 40 global fiat currencies
launched online cash payments on Microsoft’s Xbox in 22 countries
struck deals with Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS to support its migration to a cloud-based platform as part of their strategy to scale quickly and leverage data to drive customer acquisition,
a unique innovation that quickly led to a new deal with ARC, a payment settlement service that processes $97 billion for over 200 airlines globally.
Also during this time, they announced the appointments of:
Digital wallet division CEO, Chirag Patel (fmr Head of Payments at Amazon Intl., Santander)
North American iGaming CEO, Zak Cutler (fmr DraftKings exec),
Boardmember Mark Brooker (fmr COO Betfair, non-exec dir. William Hill)
All that done while reporting a profitable quarter, beating on revenue and EPS consensus, reporting 41% total payment volume (TPV) growth, refinancing all debt for significant cost savings, after putting deals in place throughout North America to lead in any new iGaming market as soon as it opens (as just happened with their 100% positioning in Canada’s newly opened sports betting market). As Bill Foley said, “we’re seeding the future growth right now… The day a state opens up, we are there ready from a regulatory perspective, from a risk perspective, and from a product perspective…It’s our job to be there first and to make sure we dominate.” They have not slept on this promise even as they quietly lay the groundwork to do the same thing in South America. Lastly, major shareholder and Paysafe Chairman of the Board, Bill Foley has repeatedly proven himself to be a trusted and highly effective deal maker with a remarkably consistent track record in growing shareholder value. Bloomberg describes Foley as someone who prides himself on operating experience, who has a known talent for corporate maneuvering and brings with him a full team of seasoned financial managers. The types of acquisitions described in Part 1 are central to Paysafe’s “value creation playbook” which is exactly how Foley, grew FIS 36x from a market cap of $2.5 billion to over $90 billion. From the beginning of the deal to bring Paysafe public, Foley said, “those characteristics of FIS are right in line with what we plan on doing with Paysafe... FIS has very similar characteristics to Paysafe – an attractive platform with a defensible market position. Upside from acquisition integration, platform consolidation and cross-selling. We will cross-sell, cross-sell, and cross-sell.” In this context, it’s worth underscoring Foley’s undeniably history of simultaneously growing multiple companies. Over just the last six years, Foley successfully grew Ceridian 3.3x, Dun & Bradstreet 5.6x, and Black Knight 8.7x. He’s also known for growing Fidelity National Financial from $3 Million market cap to $10.8 Billion (3,600x). In all cases, he has significantly expanded their margins between 500 to 1800 bps. Foley said, “My whole history and career has been around acquiring companies and fixing companies.” Though he’s not Paysafe’s front man, his fingerprints are evident and IR has recently assured that “ Bill is highly engaged with the company.” Personally, I don’t doubt it.
9. Lockup Expiration
Some bears still point to PSFE overhang from lockups but all share lockups expired months ago, except for founder shares which constitute about 4% of outstanding shares (20F p. 135). That lockup is expected to expire in December. Personally, lockup expiry of such a small percentage of shares is not deterring me from continuing to build a position before Paysafe starts reporting better numbers. This is especially true when those shares are controlled by Chairman Foley, who is central to Paysafe’s value creation playbook. Between Foley’s consistent track record, the proxy statement below and Blackstone’s stance on future growth, all signs indicate a long-term hold. Upon approving the deal to bring Paysafe public, the founders identified “base returns for a four year hold period” of “2.9x to 3.8x” from $10. From their proxy statement (SEC filing-DEFM14A): “The Business Combination could provide base returns for a four year hold period assuming exit multiples between 20-25x next twelve month EBITDA, reflecting a range of internal rate of return of 30.9% to 39.2% and a multiple on invested capital of 2.9x to 3.8x, in each case, based on the FTAC initial public offering price of $10.00 per share, while recognizing that the achievement of such returns could not be assured, and that the Business Combination has similar characteristics to other transactions involving Mr. Foley in the financial technologies industry, including an attractive platform with a defensible market position and multiple attractive acquisition opportunities to strengthen market position further, each of which made PGHL an attractive investment for FTAC.”
10. Valuation
Paysafe is building an integrated architecture that is worth more than the sum of its parts. By leveraging an asset-light cloud-based model to efficiently scale up in new high growth markets globally, Paysafe is a perfect example of the low capex Fintech profile that generally warrants high valuation multiples. Now trading around 4x a conservative F2022 revenue with nearly every institutional owner’s cost basis 20-40% higher than the current price, it would appear PSFE is severely undervalued. Perhaps because Paysafe didn't go public via the traditional IPO method it is being lumped in with highly speculative pre-revenue ventures. But Paysafe is anything but that. Or maybe the current low price is simply a reflection of broadly disseminated misleading information like the articles on debt quoted in Part 2 or like the several articles falsely claiming Paysafe went public at a 3x higher valuation above its 2017 take private price. Some articles claim this by mistaking British pounds for US dollars while a Yahoo Finance article claimed a "300% higher" valuation with bad math and a false comparison between enterprise value (inclusive of debt) and a misquoted 2017 market cap price of “$3.7 billion”, exclusive of debt. Inclusive of debt (enterprise value), Paysafe was taken private for $4.7 billion, according to Reuters. To make its bear case, that article misquotes the relevant 2017 take private value by a full billion dollars. Initially, I wondered why just about every bearish article relied on faulty or misleading information to make its valuation case, or why so many platforms misreported PSFE’s financial data, like YF’s overstating a Q1 EPS miss as -0.23 EPS instead of -0.05 (fixed months later); or why does a Credit Suisse analyst offer new price targets 4 times in 5 months with the first change just two days after initiating coverage and the last change, to neutral, just two weeks before Q3ER. Instead of waiting a few days for new data highly relevant to his thesis, the analyst cites, as if Q2 were a new revelation, months old information most of which was available before he first initiated coverage. (Coincidentally, he issued this two minutes before pre-market, precisely when PSFE was on the verge of breaking above the confluence of its 9-month downtrend resistance line and the 50DMA). Negligence or intentional price manipulation, take your pick. Skeptics may cringe at this idea but this is really nothing new. It’s not like the market is unaware of analyst conflicts of interest or that Credit Suisse has shown itself to be an upstanding market participant (think lawsuit for misleading investors on Archegos, $5.3B fine for mortgage backed securities,$2.5B fine after pleading guilty for aiding in tax fraud, and the recent $547M fine after admitting to regulatory breaches, secret loans, lying to authorities and spying on employees). On the other hand, this could be CS trying to clean up its act by playing it safe or an analyst trying to preserve his reputation by keeping price targets closer to market. If so, this may have the flip-side benefit of future incremental upgrades. Obviously, this is all conjecture, which really doesn’t matter in the long run. True price discovery will take form as share rotation plays out and Paysafe's value story becomes clear. Until then, here are a few reference points: Looking at Paysafe’s eCash segment as a separate company: The eCash segment is a high margin business with over 12 million active users, $5 billion in volume, $405 million in TTM revenue and $157 million EBITDA. For H1/21, they just reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth. Not many Fintech companies can claim that. Adyen is a Fintech with a similar growth profile, (46% YoY revenue growth and 27% YoY EBITDA growth). Applying Adyen’s 19x EV/rev ratio to Paysafe’s eCash business alone, would give it a $7.6 billion enterprise value. That’s close to the current valuation of the entirety of Paysafe, yet this one segment represents less than a third of total revenue. Using Adyen’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 149x would value Paysafe’s eCash segment at $23.3 billion. Even when applying the company’s entire debt to that one segment, the share price for just the eCash business alone would still be $26.62. Again, that represents less than a third of Paysafe’s total business. Brick & Mortar Payment Processing Paysafe is a value play right now but bears focus on growth. Paysafe has an established history of 27-30% CAGR but because recent growth was temporarily stifled by China de-risking exits and Covid-related closures, some equally hard-hit brick & mortar payment processing partners, like Visa and Mastercard, offer an interesting comparison. For 2020, Visa reported negative YoY revenue growth (-8.7%) and negative EBITDA growth (-10.2%). Similarly, Mastercard reported negative YoY revenue growth (-9.4%) and negative EBITDA growth (-14.20%). Their forward growth is projected to be 7.7% and 10% respectively. In all forward growth metrics, including EBITDA and EPS, they do worse than Paysafe, yet they both trade at an EV/Rev multiple of roughly 24X. This would put PSFE at $41.80. Digital Wallet vs. Digital Wallet Many compare the #1 digital wallet, PayPal, to the #2 digital wallet, Paysafe, so, hopefully without striking a nerve, here’s a deeper look into that comparison: As noted earlier, Paysafe’s stock was recently clobbered down 30% (to 3.2x P/S) on soft Q3 guidance even though they reaffirmed full year guidance and beat consensus on revenue and EPS. By comparison, PayPal missed Q3 guidance for both revenue and EPS. PayPal was also reported to be falling short on their 2021 full year guidance AND they missed on Q2 revenue consensus while also reporting a -23%YoY decline on EPS. PYPL only went down 10% (from a lofty 15x P/S) as news outlets characterized PayPal’s troubles as a “buying opportunity.” Some will reasonably say that’s because PayPal has such strong growth history but, from the time PayPal’s numbers were available separately from its parent eBay, 2012-2020, PayPal grew 17.8% CAGR ($5.6b to $21.5b). In that same period, Paysafe has grown 30.5% CAGR ($169m to $1.43b). Paysafe reported 27%CAGR prior to 2020’s restructuring and, in just the last year, when excluding Paysafe’s 2020 de-risking exits, they reported 23% YoY growth for Q2 which is on par with PayPal’s recent report of 19% YoY growth. This comparative history serves only to show that Paysafe has a strong track record that should not be discounted. Paysafe is still priced as if it is a zero growth, pre-revenue speculative venture. Meanwhile, though some have called PayPal a “free cash flow machine,” Paysafe already generates proportionately more free cash flow than PayPal (25% FCF margin vs. 20% FCF margin). There’s obviously more to this complex story but, for reference, below is PSFE potential share value when applying PYPL’s multiples (now 25% off highs) when factoring in all of PSFE’s potential acquisition debt and dilution:
PayPal’s EV/FCF ratio of 66.9X puts PSFE at $33.10
PayPal’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 44.3X puts PSFE at $24.90
PayPal’s Price to Sales ratio of 13.5X puts PSFE at $28.40.
PayPal’s EV/Rev ratio of 12.4x puts PSFE at $20.75
PayPal’s free cash flow yield of 1.7% puts PSFE at $29.41
Those metrics average to a share price of $27.31 When factoring in a potential 24% growth, 35% EBITDA margin, 75-80% FCF conversion, the potential share value climbs fairly quickly. Sector multiples: Because Paysafe is far more diversified than the average Fintech, a while back I compared it to a wide basket of Fintech peers including PayPal, Square, Nuvei, Repay, Shift4, Adyen, Affirm, BILL, GPN, and Paysign. Collectively, they have a ~12.5% growth rate. Unlike Paysafe, a third of this group reported negative free cash flow and negative EBITDA and half reported negative EBITDA growth. Paysafe also currently has better EPS and a better Debt/EBITDA ratio than over half the group. After removing the top-end outliers in each category that put PSFE above $100 and discounting all by an additional 10%, here’s Paysafe’s share price with the averaged peer multiples:
EV/EBITDA ratio : $45.67
EV/Rev ratio : $40.17
EV/FCF ratio : $39.72
Average : $41.84 It's worth pointing out here that, as happened with FIS’s tremendous growth history, stock prices tend to temporarily pull back in association with acquisitions. This may explain some of PSFE’s recent price action, but certainly not all. Sure, it’s easy to read all of the material in Parts 1-10 and say, “the market doesn’t care,” but I’m confident that’ll change when share rotation settles and quarterly ER’s gradually shift focus from the past to the future. Stripped of superficial misdirection, bear arguments often devolve down to variations of “look at the chart” and “price is truth.” This has been said about many companies in the past as they position themselves for future growth. No, this is not the next Amazon but Bezos had it right when he said, “The stock is not the company. And the company is not the stock. ... And so, while the stock price was going the wrong way, everything inside the company was going the right way.” Do with this what you will. These are simply observations. Feel free to correct any errors, point out things I missed or use this material any way you wish. To be perfectly clear, this is not financial advice. I am not a financial advisor nor am I associated in any way with any commercial interests beyond my own. Given how much disinformation has been out there, I thought I’d do my bit to peel back the layers on what I consider to be a reliable long term investment. This concludes our public service announcement. We now return to normal programming.
Date: 2021-11-04 09:13:35, Author:u/greensymbiote, (Karma: 4073, Created:Jan-2021) SubReddit:WallStreetBets, DD Click Here TickerDatabase was not updated due too many tickers. Here are the final Parts 8-10, of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Parts 1-7 covered Paysafe’s outlook on growth, debt, and profit, along with insider ownership and competition. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1 (Growth), and following the links from there if still interested.
8. Management
As part of Paysafe’s preparations for the next phase of growth, the company has undergone a complete management overhaul. Along with replacing nearly all the Board of Directors, in the last two years, they’ve hired a new CEO, new CFO, new CTO, new CIO, new CRO and new CISO. They’ve hired PayPal’s Chief Risk Officer and have also filled key division CEO positions with Facebook’s Head of Payments and Amazon Intl’s Head of Payments. This does not sound like an operation with a passive outlook. Still, many are rightfully frustrated that management has done little publicly to support the share price since going public. Despite a steady supply of positive news, the CEO has not once meaningfully engaged the media to highlight Paysafe’s value story. It may be that management is deliberately downplaying its messaging while shares move from short-term trader’s hands to those of value-seeking funds in order to better secure long-term share value. Or, they are simply focused on producing the numbers. Regardless, what management may lack in public storytelling, it makes up for in execution. In the short time since they went public, they have announced 3 new acquisitions and over 25 expanded partnerships with the likes of Visa, Coinbase, Fubo Gaming, FOXbet, Golden Nugget, Bankable, Wix, Repay, WynnBet, Betfred USA, OwnersBox, Dutch neobank bunq, IntelliPay, Glory Ltd, Parx Interactive, TripGift, SweePay, SimplePayMe, Smart Property Systems, Ambassador Cruise Line, Shelby Financial, ResponseCRM, ZEN, Montana Lottery, PlayUP, SuperBook Sports and Bitrise. In that same period, they’ve also:
expanded their US launch of digital wallet Skrill to 48 states,
expanded their digital wallets to trade 38 [digital]currencies and 40 global fiat currencies
launched online cash payments on Microsoft’s Xbox in 22 countries
struck deals with Snowflake and Amazon’s AWS to support its migration to a cloud-based platform as part of their strategy to scale quickly and leverage data to drive customer acquisition,
a unique innovation that quickly led to a new deal with ARC, a payment settlement service that processes $97 billion for over 200 airlines globally.
Also during this time, they announced the appointments of:
Digital wallet division CEO, Chirag Patel (fmr Head of Payments at Amazon Intl., Santander)
North American iGaming CEO, Zak Cutler (fmr DraftKings exec),
Boardmember Mark Brooker (fmr COO Betfair, non-exec dir. William Hill)
All that done while reporting a profitable quarter, beating on revenue and EPS consensus, reporting 41% total payment volume (TPV) growth, refinancing all debt for significant cost savings, after putting deals in place throughout North America to lead in any new iGaming market as soon as it opens (as just happened with their 100% positioning in Canada’s newly opened sports betting market). As Bill Foley said, “we’re seeding the future growth right now… The day a state opens up, we are there ready from a regulatory perspective, from a risk perspective, and from a product perspective…It’s our job to be there first and to make sure we dominate.” They have not slept on this promise even as they quietly lay the groundwork to do the same thing in South America. Lastly, major shareholder and Paysafe Chairman of the Board, Bill Foley has repeatedly proven himself to be a trusted and highly effective deal maker with a remarkably consistent track record in growing shareholder value. Bloomberg describes Foley as someone who prides himself on operating experience, who has a known talent for corporate maneuvering and brings with him a full team of seasoned financial managers. The types of acquisitions described in Part 1 are central to Paysafe’s “value creation playbook” which is exactly how Foley, grew FIS 36x from a market cap of $2.5 billion to over $90 billion. From the beginning of the deal to bring Paysafe public, Foley said, “those characteristics of FIS are right in line with what we plan on doing with Paysafe... FIS has very similar characteristics to Paysafe – an attractive platform with a defensible market position. Upside from acquisition integration, platform consolidation and cross-selling. We will cross-sell, cross-sell, and cross-sell.” In this context, it’s worth underscoring Foley’s undeniably history of simultaneously growing multiple companies. Over just the last six years, Foley successfully grew Ceridian 3.3x, Dun & Bradstreet 5.6x, and Black Knight 8.7x. He’s also known for growing Fidelity National Financial from $3 Million market cap to $10.8 Billion (3,600x). In all cases, he has significantly expanded their margins between 500 to 1800 bps. Foley said, “My whole history and career has been around acquiring companies and fixing companies.” Though he’s not Paysafe’s front man, his fingerprints are evident and IR has recently assured that “ Bill is highly engaged with the company.” Personally, I don’t doubt it.
9. Lockup Expiration
Some bears still point to PSFE overhang from lockups but all share lockups expired months ago, except for founder shares which constitute about 4% of outstanding shares (20F p. 135). That lockup is expected to expire in December. Personally, lockup expiry of such a small percentage of shares is not deterring me from continuing to build a position before Paysafe starts reporting better numbers. This is especially true when those shares are controlled by Chairman Foley, who is central to Paysafe’s value creation playbook. Between Foley’s consistent track record, the proxy statement below and Blackstone’s stance on future growth, all signs indicate a long-term hold. Upon approving the deal to bring Paysafe public, the founders identified “base returns for a four year hold period” of “2.9x to 3.8x” from $10. From their proxy statement (SEC filing-DEFM14A): “The Business Combination could provide base returns for a four year hold period assuming exit multiples between 20-25x next twelve month EBITDA, reflecting a range of internal rate of return of 30.9% to 39.2% and a multiple on invested capital of 2.9x to 3.8x, in each case, based on the FTAC initial public offering price of $10.00 per share, while recognizing that the achievement of such returns could not be assured, and that the Business Combination has similar characteristics to other transactions involving Mr. Foley in the financial technologies industry, including an attractive platform with a defensible market position and multiple attractive acquisition opportunities to strengthen market position further, each of which made PGHL an attractive investment for FTAC.”
10. Valuation
Paysafe is building an integrated architecture that is worth more than the sum of its parts. By leveraging an asset-light cloud-based model to efficiently scale up in new high growth markets globally, Paysafe is a perfect example of the low capex Fintech profile that generally warrants high valuation multiples. Now trading around 4x a conservative F2022 revenue with nearly every institutional owner’s cost basis 20-40% higher than the current price, it would appear PSFE is severely undervalued. Perhaps because Paysafe didn't go public via the traditional IPO method it is being lumped in with highly speculative pre-revenue ventures. But Paysafe is anything but that. Or maybe the current low price is simply a reflection of broadly disseminated misleading information like the articles on debt quoted in Part 2 or like the several articles falsely claiming Paysafe went public at a 3x higher valuation above its 2017 take private price. Some articles claim this by mistaking British pounds for US dollars while a Yahoo Finance article claimed a "300% higher" valuation with bad math and a false comparison between enterprise value (inclusive of debt) and a misquoted 2017 market cap price of “$3.7 billion”, exclusive of debt. Inclusive of debt (enterprise value), Paysafe was taken private for $4.7 billion, according to Reuters. To make its bear case, that article misquotes the relevant 2017 take private value by a full billion dollars. Initially, I wondered why just about every bearish article relied on faulty or misleading information to make its valuation case, or why so many platforms misreported PSFE’s financial data, like YF’s overstating a Q1 EPS miss as -0.23 EPS instead of -0.05 (fixed months later); or why does a Credit Suisse analyst offer new price targets 4 times in 5 months with the first change just two days after initiating coverage and the last change, to neutral, just two weeks before Q3ER. Instead of waiting a few days for new data highly relevant to his thesis, the analyst cites, as if Q2 were a new revelation, months old information most of which was available before he first initiated coverage. (Coincidentally, he issued this two minutes before pre-market, precisely when PSFE was on the verge of breaking above the confluence of its 9-month downtrend resistance line and the 50DMA). Negligence or intentional price manipulation, take your pick. Skeptics may cringe at this idea but this is really nothing new. It’s not like the market is unaware of analyst conflicts of interest or that Credit Suisse has shown itself to be an upstanding market participant (think lawsuit for misleading investors on Archegos, $5.3B fine for mortgage backed securities,$2.5B fine after pleading guilty for aiding in tax fraud, and the recent $547M fine after admitting to regulatory breaches, secret loans, lying to authorities and spying on employees). On the other hand, this could be CS trying to clean up its act by playing it safe or an analyst trying to preserve his reputation by keeping price targets closer to market. If so, this may have the flip-side benefit of future incremental upgrades. Obviously, this is all conjecture, which really doesn’t matter in the long run. True price discovery will take form as share rotation plays out and Paysafe's value story becomes clear. Until then, here are a few reference points: Looking at Paysafe’s eCash segment as a separate company: The eCash segment is a high margin business with over 12 million active users, $5 billion in volume, $405 million in TTM revenue and $157 million EBITDA. For H1/21, they just reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth. Not many Fintech companies can claim that. Adyen is a Fintech with a similar growth profile, (46% YoY revenue growth and 27% YoY EBITDA growth). Applying Adyen’s 19x EV/rev ratio to Paysafe’s eCash business alone, would give it a $7.6 billion enterprise value. That’s close to the current valuation of the entirety of Paysafe, yet this one segment represents less than a third of total revenue. Using Adyen’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 149x would value Paysafe’s eCash segment at $23.3 billion. Even when applying the company’s entire debt to that one segment, the share price for just the eCash business alone would still be $26.62. Again, that represents less than a third of Paysafe’s total business. Brick & Mortar Payment Processing Paysafe is a value play right now but bears focus on growth. Paysafe has an established history of 27-30% CAGR but because recent growth was temporarily stifled by China de-risking exits and Covid-related closures, some equally hard-hit brick & mortar payment processing partners, like Visa and Mastercard, offer an interesting comparison. For 2020, Visa reported negative YoY revenue growth (-8.7%) and negative EBITDA growth (-10.2%). Similarly, Mastercard reported negative YoY revenue growth (-9.4%) and negative EBITDA growth (-14.20%). Their forward growth is projected to be 7.7% and 10% respectively. In all forward growth metrics, including EBITDA and EPS, they do worse than Paysafe, yet they both trade at an EV/Rev multiple of roughly 24X. This would put PSFE at $41.80. Digital Wallet vs. Digital Wallet Many compare the #1 digital wallet, PayPal, to the #2 digital wallet, Paysafe, so, hopefully without striking a nerve, here’s a deeper look into that comparison: As noted earlier, Paysafe’s stock was recently clobbered down 30% (to 3.2x P/S) on soft Q3 guidance even though they reaffirmed full year guidance and beat consensus on revenue and EPS. By comparison, PayPal missed Q3 guidance for both revenue and EPS. PayPal was also reported to be falling short on their 2021 full year guidance AND they missed on Q2 revenue consensus while also reporting a -23%YoY decline on EPS. PYPL only went down 10% (from a lofty 15x P/S) as news outlets characterized PayPal’s troubles as a “buying opportunity.” Some will reasonably say that’s because PayPal has such strong growth history but, from the time PayPal’s numbers were available separately from its parent eBay, 2012-2020, PayPal grew 17.8% CAGR ($5.6b to $21.5b). In that same period, Paysafe has grown 30.5% CAGR ($169m to $1.43b). Paysafe reported 27%CAGR prior to 2020’s restructuring and, in just the last year, when excluding Paysafe’s 2020 de-risking exits, they reported 23% YoY growth for Q2 which is on par with PayPal’s recent report of 19% YoY growth. This comparative history serves only to show that Paysafe has a strong track record that should not be discounted. Paysafe is still priced as if it is a zero growth, pre-revenue speculative venture. Meanwhile, though some have called PayPal a “free cash flow machine,” Paysafe already generates proportionately more free cash flow than PayPal (25% FCF margin vs. 20% FCF margin). There’s obviously more to this complex story but, for reference, below is PSFE potential share value when applying PYPL’s multiples (now 25% off highs) when factoring in all of PSFE’s potential acquisition debt and dilution:
PayPal’s EV/FCF ratio of 66.9X puts PSFE at $33.10
PayPal’s EV/EBITDA ratio of 44.3X puts PSFE at $24.90
PayPal’s Price to Sales ratio of 13.5X puts PSFE at $28.40.
PayPal’s EV/Rev ratio of 12.4x puts PSFE at $20.75
PayPal’s free cash flow yield of 1.7% puts PSFE at $29.41
Those metrics average to a share price of $27.31 When factoring in a potential 24% growth, 35% EBITDA margin, 75-80% FCF conversion, the potential share value climbs fairly quickly. Sector multiples: Because Paysafe is far more diversified than the average Fintech, a while back I compared it to a wide basket of Fintech peers including PayPal, Square, Nuvei, Repay, Shift4, Adyen, Affirm, BILL, GPN, and Paysign. Collectively, they have a ~12.5% growth rate. Unlike Paysafe, a third of this group reported negative free cash flow and negative EBITDA and half reported negative EBITDA growth. Paysafe also currently has better EPS and a better Debt/EBITDA ratio than over half the group. After removing the top-end outliers in each category that put PSFE above $100 and discounting all by an additional 10%, here’s Paysafe’s share price with the averaged peer multiples:
EV/EBITDA ratio : $45.67
EV/Rev ratio : $40.17
EV/FCF ratio : $39.72
Average : $41.84 It's worth pointing out here that, as happened with FIS’s tremendous growth history, stock prices tend to temporarily pull back in association with acquisitions. This may explain some of PSFE’s recent price action, but certainly not all. Sure, it’s easy to read all of the material in Parts 1-10 and say, “the market doesn’t care,” but I’m confident that’ll change when share rotation settles and quarterly ER’s gradually shift focus from the past to the future. Stripped of superficial misdirection, bear arguments often devolve down to variations of “look at the chart” and “price is truth.” This has been said about many companies in the past as they position themselves for future growth. No, this is not the next Amazon but Bezos had it right when he said, “The stock is not the company. And the company is not the stock. ... And so, while the stock price was going the wrong way, everything inside the company was going the right way.” Do with this what you will. These are simply observations. Feel free to correct any errors, point out things I missed or use this material any way you wish. To be perfectly clear, this is not financial advice. I am not a financial advisor nor am I associated in any way with any commercial interests beyond my own. Given how much disinformation has been out there, I thought I’d do my bit to peel back the layers on what I consider to be a reliable long term investment. This concludes our public service announcement. We now return to normal programming.
Date: 2021-11-02 09:38:24, Author:u/greensymbiote, (Karma: 3931, Created:Jan-2021) SubReddit:WallStreetBets, DD Click Here SomeTickers mentioned in this post: BLK 950.275 |C 69.24 |FISV 97.575 |FOUR 62.07 |PAYS 2.69 |PSFE 7.815 |SQ 252.52 | Here are Parts 2 - 4 of an article addressing the main bear arguments on Paysafe. Part 1 covers Paysafe’s outlook on growth, and an expected miss for Q3ER. I recommend starting with the introduction in Part 1, and following the links if still interested.
2. Debt
Paysafe’s recent acquisitions, (two of which now completed) have spawned several misleading claims using faulty numbers to generate doubt about the company’s ability to manage debt. For example:
One article tried to make a specific case that Paysafe can’t cover debt due to Q2’s 46% free cash flow conversion rate. The author's acrobatic bias ignores the obvious fact that the Q2 balance sheet clearly states a year-to-date free cash flow conversion rate of 70%, not 46%. The CFO noted that Q2’s conversion rate was temporarily affected by a one-time tax payment that is to be partially refunded. (Notably, Q1’s free cash flow conversion rate was 96%. At $108 million, it was a 28% YoY increase.)
Another article cries liquidity problems, citing, “Paysafe Ltds earnings cannot cover its interest expense. If the situation continues, the company may have to issue more debt.” By relying on websites that blindly auto-calculate debt service ratios, the article doesn't account for recent debt restructuring and dramatically misrepresents forward expenses by ignoring:
$84 million in one-time merger related expenses will not be repeated,
over $40 million in one-time debt restructuring fees will not be repeated,
newly reduced interest expenses resulting in roughly $70 million in annualized savings.
A third article mistakenly claims Paysafe, “will add another $1 billion in net debt to close the Latin America deals.” In truth, the two deals mentioned total $550 million (SafetyPay at $441m and Pago Efectivo at $108.5m). A third European acquisition, viafintech, is reported to be valued at $42.5 million euros ($49 million USD). While the three deals total roughly $598 million, much of that can be covered between Paysafe’s $247.8 million in cash, their $270 million in undrawn revolving credit and their $360-$430 million in free cash flow. Total added debt will likely be less than half of what the article assumes. (In fairness, the author later admitted he read the transcript wrong.)
After paying down $1.2 billion in debt in Q1, Paysafe used its two notch credit rating upgrade from Moody’s and S&P to reorganize remaining debt, extend maturity and significantly lower average interest rates, reducing interest expenses by $70 million. The result, inclusive of new debt from acquisitions: credit upgrades were reaffirmed along with a $305 million revolving credit facility and the company will save around $43 million in annualized interest expense.This means forward debt-related costs are on track to drop by more than half, from an estimated $165 million in 2021 to less than $80 million in 2022. Combined with $84 million in other non-recurring merger-related expenses, that’s over $160 million in cost reductions going forward.Strong free cash flow and over $160 million in reduced costs can go a long way to quickly paying down debt. Add in the expected acquisition growth synergies and the company’s quoted path to a 35% EBITDA margin, and the picture looks even better. Management noted, “the deal synergies and our growth profile will allow us to de-lever quickly and meaningfully make progress in 2022 towards our target of 3.5 times adjusted EBITDA.” The very realistic potential of 17-18% revenue growth could attain that target ratio in short order.All this points to sustainable deleveraging, paving the way for more growth through M&A. (It also doesn’t hurt that the company stands to take in more than half a billion cash from outstanding warrants, which will directly benefit enterprise value and inorganic growth potential.)Carrying large debt is extremely common in the Fintech sector and Paysafe is by no means an outlier here. (Square, Repay, Fiserv, Shift4, Affirm, Bill and Paysign all have worse debt/EBITDA ratios and most of them still have negative earnings). In itself, debt leverage is not a bad thing, particularly if it’s manageable and generates more growth. That definitely appears to be the case here.
3. Profit
When considering how Paysafe is setting itself up for future profit potential, here are some points worth underscoring:
Without $92 million in non-recurring costs, Q1 would have been very profitable, beating analysts consensus by as much +0.10 EPS.
Despite Q2’s $40 million in non-repeating costs, Paysafe still managed to beat on earnings with its first profitable quarter as a newly public company.
Roughly $167 million in H1 expenses will not repeat going forward:
$84m one-time share based compensation,
$40m one-time accelerated capitalized debt fees,
$43m estimated reduction in annual interest expenses
Those reductions alone represent a potential +0.22 EPS, which exceeds analysts projections. (Some platforms have reported analysts estimate 3-400% profit growth for 2022 with an average of 75% annual profit growth thereafter. Fortunately, on Q3 guidance, analysts have been revising their forward estimates downwards which ultimately better positions PSFE to beat consensus down the road. This contrasts with analysts’ initial EPS estimates which did not appear to fully account for the one-time merger and debt restructuring costs.)
Paysafe’s margins are also expected to expand as they work through deliberate measures to de-risk future growth. For example, their integrated processing take rate has been compressed by strategic Direct Marketing exits in anticipation of new compliance rules. This is expected to abate by end of year. Management notes: “we do expect EBITDA margins to expand in the back-half of the year and to continue that like a steady drumbeat going into next year as well” reflecting “continued strength in integrated processing, including the on-boarding of several new e-commerce clients in late Q3 and early Q4, stronger growth in digital wallet as well as sequential improvement in direct marketing.”
Between Q3 and FY guidance, there is an implied guidance for a Q4 EBITDA of $153 million. That represents a YoY EBITDA growth of 60.5%, which may offer a signal as to how moving beyond legacy de-risking headwinds can start to improve the margin picture going forward.
Their fastest growing segment, eCash, has a high take rate of 7.2%. For H1/21, they reported 49.4% YoY revenue growth and 81.6% YoY EBITDA growth which would reasonably point to a future business mix with higher overall margins. Further growth in this segment stands to benefit from their new LATAM expansion, their new Glory Ltd partnership, as well as their recently launched US campaign to engage the US/Mexico remittance market (worth $40 billion annually). Also, their Xbox deal expands eCash in 22 countries and their recent deals with ZEN, REPAY, and IntelliPay further expands their eCash network across the US and in 25 European countries.
With a gross margin of 61-63%, upon execution of their two year strategy to “unlock over $100m organic adj. EBITDA” (page 28), management cites a potential “pro forma upside that could drive EBITDA CAGR to 21%.”
One aspect of this margin expansion strategy is in the company’s ongoing integration of their various business segments into a single code on a cloud-based gateway, the Unity Platform. This streamlining will enable them to reduce costs and scale up quickly in new markets and in emerging verticals like travel, trading in the wallet, digital goods, online gaming, and banking as a service. Among the benefits of this new synthesis:
it increases operating margins through cost-saving efficiencies and eliminating redundancies (automating underwriting, 2/3 reduction in data centers)
it enables them to forward unsolicited cost savings to partners, merchants and users, helping them retain and gain new marketshare,
it eliminates on-boarding each service separately by making their entire suite automatically available through a single gateway, which builds in substantial cross-selling opportunities
4. Float
The number of institutional funds owning PSFE has grown from 187 to 297 over the last quarter. At this point, nearly all the major funds hold shares at a cost basis much higher than the current price. These include Wells Fargo, Blackrock, Citigroup, State Street, JP Morgan, Francisco Partners, Naya Capital and noted fund managers like Dan Loeb (Third Point), David Tepper (Appaloosa), Aaron Cohen (Survetta), Seth Rosen (Nitorum) and Leon Cooperman, (who personally owns over a million shares). Notably, most of these investors bought shares before Paysafe’s recent history of value creation. Cross-referencing the most up to date record with older filings, some estimate the true available float is between 70-80 million shares. For what has historically been a low beta stock, theoretically, a reduced free float influences the proportionate affect of true short interest and could cause the stock price to move faster. Links to the rest of the article can be found in Part 1 once they are complete. Let me know if you’d prefer a single post of the entire article. Note: some article links are missing because they are banned by this sub
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IQ Option là gì! IQ Option có thực sự kiếm được tiền
IQ Option là gì? Hình thức hoạt động ra sao?
IQ Option là một sàn giao dịch quyền chọn nhị phân (Binany Option). Quyền chọn nhị phân nghĩa là bạn chỉ có 2 lựa chọn trong quá trình giao dịch. Giao dịch quyền chọn nhị phân như IQ Option, Olymptrade luôn là vấn đề đang được tranh cãi nhiều người bởi mức độ rủi ro của nó cao. Bạn chỉ có thể UP/DOWN (Tăng/Giảm) trong một khoảng thời gian nhất định. Nếu bạn chọn đúng bạn thắng, chọn sai bạn thua mất tiền. Tuy nhiên, so với đầu tư forex, hay chứng khoán, giao dịch quyền chọn rất dễ chơi, cùng cách tiếp cận đơn giản và số nạp tiền tối thiểu thấp. Điều này đã làm cho ai cũng có thể tham gia, thử trải nghiệm giao dịch quyền chọn. Sàn IQ Option cung cấp nền tảng chơi nhị phân dựa trên biến động của các cặp tiền tệ quốc tế, chứng khoản, tiền ảo… dưới dạng chỉ số. Kiểu như bạn mua cổ phiếu hay mua bitcoin nhưng theo kiểu chỉ đánh vào chỉ số chứ bạn không thực nhận giá trị ấy. Chỉ số bạn đánh đúng xu hướng tăng hoặc giảm trong khoảng thời gian 1 phút, 5 phút, 15 phút thì bạn thắng. Sai xu hướng đường đi của chỉ số thì bạn thua.
Đánh giá sàn IQ Option với những sàn Binary Option khác
IQ Option hiện tại đang là sàn môi giới quyền chọn nhị phân (Binary Option) lớn nhất Châu Âu và có thể nói là sàn môi giới uy tín nhất Thế giới trong lĩnh vực này. Theo thống kê của Similarweb thì iqoption.com đứng ở vị trí 5 trên toàn cầu cao hơn cả Olymp Trade, Binomo,…
Có nên đầu tư chơi IQ Option hay không?
Đầu tư kiếm tiền phải có kế hoạch. Không đơn giản chỉ là đăng ký tài khoản, nộp tiền vào là phát sinh lãi ngay. Bạn cần phải trang bị kiến thức, tâm lý, làm quen với ứng dụng bằng tài khoản Demo. Tìm hiểu các chỉ số, cách đọc số liệu để có thể đưa ra những nhận định đúng về xu hướng tăng hay giảm trong giao dịch quyền chọn nhị phân được. Ngoài ra, phải có kế hoạch cho việc mình đầu tư chơi. Phải đưa ra những kịch bản xấu nhất để mình không bị mất kiểm soát nhé! Vì là đầu tư thì sẽ có thắng thua, mất trắng. Không nên nhìn vào những tài khoản facebook khoe tiền, thắng ngàn đô mà chơi theo mất trắng nha. Bây giờ, có những nhóm trade IQ Option theo tín hiệu singal hoặc theo trade iq option bằng Robot auto. Theo bạn thì tỉ lệ win mỗi giao dịch là bao nhiêu? Nên hãy tỉnh táo trước mọi thông tin nhé! Đọc đến đây nếu bạn muốn thử nghiệm thì hãy đăng ký thử một tài khoản demo mà thực hành nha! Link bên dưới. Nguồn: https://iqoptiontips.com/iq-option-la-gi-danh-gia-chi-tiet-san-iq-option-nam-2020
RaidenBO — Binary Options (Quyền chọn nhị phân) hay Trade BO là gì?
Binary Options có nghĩa là Quyền chọn nhị phân hay thường được các nhà giao dịch gọi là Trade BO, một số tên gọi khác như quyền chọn kép, quyền lựa chọn kỹ thuật số, quyền chọn lãi cố định. Đây là hình thức dự đoán giá trị của các tài sản (như vàng, chứng khoán, cổ phiếu,Tiền Điện Tử v.v.. ) sẽ biến động như thế nào trong một khoảng thời gian nhất định. Dựa vào sự tăng hoặc giảm của loại tài sản này mà nhà đầu tư sẽ chọn loại đầu tư phù hợp để kiếm lời. Quyền chọn nhị phân áp dụng cho thị trường ngoại hối, thị trường phi tập trung toàn cầu cho việc trao đổi các loại tiền tệ. Thông thường người mua quyền chọn nhị phân sẽ đưa ra dự đoán giá của loại tài sản sẽ di chuyển theo hướng nào tại thời điểm mua — tăng hay giảm. Nếu giá di chuyển đúng hướng, người chơi sẽ có lợi nhuận, nhưng nếu giá di chuyển sai hướng, người chơi sẽ phải chịu rủi ro mất chi phí của quyền chọn nhị phân. Dựa trên các tính năng đặc biệt của nó, thị trường Binary Option ngày càng trở nên phổ biến hơn. Binary Option cho phép nhà giao dịch biết trước khoản lời cũng như số vốn họ có thể bị lỗ trước khi vào lệnh, nhờ vậy họ có thể kiểm soát nhiều hợp đồng giao dịch cùng lúc một cách dễ dàng.
Tính hợp pháp của Binary Option tại Việt Nam
Việc kinh doanh quyền chọn nhị phân chưa có quy định của pháp luật ở bất kỳ quốc gia nào. Hiện nay có thể tham gia kinh doanh quyền chọn nhị phân một cách hợp pháp ở Việt Nam. Khác với thị trường ngoại hối, thị trường quyền chọn kép không thuộc quản lý của Ngân hàng Nhà nước Việt Nam.
Binary Options (Trade BO) có lừa đảo không?
Binary Options (Trade BO) thực chất thì không phải là một trò lừa đảo, nó còn là hợp pháp chứ không phải phi pháp. Trade BO thường được so sánh với Forex (thị trường ngoại hối) hay thị trường chứng khoán, tuy nhiên, đây là hai hình thức khá khác nhau. Đối với các thị trường tuyền thống như Forex hay chứng khoán, khi bạn mua thì sẽ có người bán đối ứng. Tiền được chuyển từ người này sang người khác. Các công ty chỉ có vai trò trung gian ăn hoa hồng thông qua các lệnh của bạn. Giao dịch Quyền Chọn không giống các thị trường truyền thống. Chính vì thế, có tồn tại 1 nhà cái đứng ở phía sau. Nghĩa là những sàn Giao dịch Quyền Chọn chính xác là 1 nhà cái. Và khi bạn chơi Quyền Chọn, bạn trở thành player (người chơi), còn nhà cái là 1 banker.
RaidenBO là gì ?
RaidenBO hay Wefinex2 chính là sàn giao dịch quyền chọn nhị hứa hẹn tạo nên cách mạng tài chính 1 lần nữa giúp bạn thay đổi cuộc đời khi đã lỡ mất cơ hội tham gia sàn Wefinex thời điểm mới ra mắt hồi tháng 4. Một số site BO cũng có thể đi sự thành công của Wefinex và quảng bá rằng đó là Wefinex 2 thì mình có thông tin chắc chắn từ những leader lớn của Wefinex là RaidenBO sẽ là wefinex 2. RaidenBO sẽ vẫn có những điểm mạnh và khắc phục hoàn toàn những điểm yếu của Wefinex hiện tại. Đây là cơ hội dành cho:
Những ai bỏ lỡ cơ hội làm giàu từ đầu với wefinex
Những ai mong chờ sự ra đời của #WE2 để xếp chỗ thật sớm.
Những ai đang làm tài chính thua lỗ và chưa thành công
Những ai đang muốn thay đổi cuộc sống và trở nên siêu giàu.
RaidenBO là gì ? Các kênh kiếm tiền với RaidenBO .
Giao dịch — Cách giao dịch RaidenBO — RaidenBO giao dịch ra sao? Mô hình nhị phân tương tự như Binomo, IQ, Olymtrade nhưng lợi nhuận là 95% và không có M5 M15, M30 hay H1. Tiền sử dụng là đồng USDT thông dụng hơn so với đồng Win của wefinex . Nạp rút quy đổi ra các đồng tiền điện tử khác như Bitcoin(BTC), ethereum(ETH) , Tether ( USDT ) sau đó có thể quy về VNĐ trên các sàn giao dịch Remitano,Aliniex v.v… Lượng trader giao dịch lớn và lệnh đóng mở được lưu lại nên bạn yên tâm giao dịch. Nến sàn chạy kết hợp của 3 sàn: Binance, Okex, CoinBase. Chỉ có duy nhất BTC/USDT không có biều đồ cặp tiền hay hàng hoá khác Giao dịch trên RaidenBO cũng đơn giản, chọn TĂNG ↑ hoặc GIẢM ↓ trong vòng 30s. Sau đó, chờ kết quả thị trường cũng tương tự 30s. Bước 1: Đặt số tiền cược USD (Mỗi lần đặt lệnh hoặc load lại sẽ mặc định là 10$ các bạn chú ý sửa trước khi vào lệnh Bước 2: Hãy đặt lệnh 30s, chọn TĂNG hoặc GIẢM Bước 3: Chờ kết quả 30s
Thua số tiền cược
Thắng: 95% số tiền cược. VD: Cược 100$ thì sẽ được 95$
Lời Kết
Việc 1 sàn đã tạo được thành công lớn như Wefinex ra mắt thêm sàn giao dịch mới như RaidenBO chắc chắn sẽ tạo nên cơn sốt trên thị trường đặc biệt là thời điểm cuối năm 2020 như hiện nay . Hứa hẹn nhiều triệu phú đô la thế hệ 2.0 sẽ ra đời tương tự Wefinex , Eagle Capital tự hào là đội nhóm đi đầu thông tin về dự án RaidenBO . Để biết thêm thông tin một cách sớm nhất anh em có thể tham gia các kênh thông tin của RaidenBO Group tại đây :
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![Hướng dẫn chơi Binomo Forex trên điện thoại [Mới nhất 2019] - Binomo Việt Nam](https://external-preview.redd.it/RJJAzArUgnAVkFFcMkiY3pWLDjTtv4kdXMCVD-0ZNKU.jpg?width=320&crop=smart&auto=webp&s=8569fa53fc7a51b5c76ffde391779703a594d272 "Hướng dẫn chơi Binomo Forex trên điện thoại [Mới nhất 2019] - Binomo Việt Nam")
